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Abstract
What monetary policy framework, if adopted by the Federal Reserve, would have avoided
the Great Inﬂation of the 1960s and 1970s? We use counterfactual simulations of an esti-
mated model of the U.S. economy to evaluate alternative monetary policy strategies. We
show that policies constructed using modern optimal control techniques aimed at stabi-
lizing inﬂation, economic activity, and interest rates would have succeeded in achieving a
high degree of economic stability as well as price stability only if the Federal Reserve had
possessed excellent information regarding the structure of the economy or if it had acted
as if it placed relatively low weight on stabilizing the real economy. Neither condition held
true. We document that policymakers at the time both had an overly optimistic view of
the natural rate of unemployment and put a high priority on achieving full employment.
We show that in the presence of realistic informational imperfections and with an emphasis
on stabilizing economic activity, an optimal control approach would have failed to keep
inﬂation expectations well anchored, resulting in highly volatile inﬂation during the 1970s.
Finally, we show that a strategy of following a robust ﬁrst-diﬀerence policy rule would have
been highly successful in the presence of informational imperfections. This robust monetary
policy rule yields simulated outcomes that are close to those seen during the period of the
Great Moderation starting in the mid-1980s.
Keywords: Great Inﬂation, rational expectations, robust control, model uncertainty, nat-
ural rate of unemployment.
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San Francisco, CA 94105, Tel.: (415) 974-2240, e-mail: John.C.Williams@sf.frb.org.In monetary policy central bankers have a potent means for fostering stability in
the general price level. By training, if not also by temperament, they are inclined
to lay great stress on price stability. ... And yet, despite their antipathy to
inﬂation and the powerful weapons they could yield against it, central bankers
have failed so utterly in this mission in recent years. In this paradox lies the
anguish of central banking. (Arthur Burns, 1979, p. 7)
1 Introduction
Numerous explanations have been put forward for the policy failures that led to the Great
Inﬂation of the late 1960s and 1970s in the United States. But one explanation that may be
the most worrisome for the future is that these policy mistakes were made by otherwise well-
informed and well-intentioned policymakers, free of institutional and political constraints.
The epigraph quoted above, from the 1979 Per Jacobsson Lecture Arthur Burns delivered
shortly after the end of his tenure as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, exempliﬁes this con-
cern. In this paper, we provide a historical account of the Great Inﬂation and subsequent
evolution of the economy in the United States using an estimated model with such a benev-
olent and sophisticated policymaker. We examine how the economy would have fared if the
Federal Reserve had applied modern optimal control techniques—of the type recommended
by many academic researchers today—to reach its policy decisions from the middle of the
1960s on.1 We then compare the resulting simulated outcomes to those obtained under
alternative monetary policy strategies designed to be robust to model misspeciﬁcation.
The main thesis of this paper is that the modern optimal control approach to monetary
policy is prone to committing the same types of policy errors that led to the Great Inﬂa-
tion, while alternative robust policy strategies could have fared much better. Our reading of
the narrative evidence highlights three critical mistakes that contributed to the unmooring
1Optimal control methods were ﬁrst developed in the 1960s and have gained popularity in the academic
literature during the past 10 years. See Svensson and Woodford, 2003; Woodford, 2003; Giannoni and
Woodford, 2005; and Svensson and Tetlow, 2005, for modern derivations and applications of optimal control
techniques to monetary policy. See Levin and Williams (2003) and Orphanides and Williams (2008, 2009)
for analysis of the optimal control approach to realistic degrees of uncertainty.
1of inﬂation expectations and the resulting runaway inﬂation of the Great Inﬂation. First,
policymakers placed a high priority on stabilizing real economic activity relative to price sta-
bility. Second, they severely overestimated the productive capacity of the economy during
the critical period of 1965-1975. In particular, contemporaneous measures of the unem-
ployment rate corresponding to full employment were signiﬁcantly lower than retrospective
estimates. Third, they were overly conﬁdent of their understanding of the precise linkage
between measures of utilization gaps and inﬂation. The modern optimal control approach
is not designed to protect against any of these three errors.
This paper provides a “stress test” of optimal control policies and other policy strategies
to see how they would have fared in times of particular macroeconomic turmoil and when the
central bank faced imperfect information. The 1960s and 1970s provide an ideal laboratory
for such an experiment. The U.S. economy was buﬀeted by large shocks, providing severe
stress to the economy, and the realized macroeconomic performance was abysmal. Our
analysis is related to that of Orphanides (2002) and Orphanides and Williams (2005a),
who show that a strong response to ﬂawed measures of economic slack contributed to the
poor performance during the 1960s and 1970s. The contribution of the current paper is to
analyze the performance of optimal control policies and alternative policy approaches using
counterfactual simulations of the U.S. economy over the past several decades. In so doing,
we aim to use the experiences of the past to glean lessons for the design of robust monetary
policy for the future.
Our model respects the natural rate hypothesis and shares key features with modern
models used for monetary policy analysis. We investigate what would have happened over
history had policymakers implemented state-of-the-art optimal control methods under the
assumption of rational expectations. We focus on the diﬃculties associated with anchoring
inﬂation expectations when policymakers attempt to maintain a high degree of employment
stability relative to price stability in an environment where the central bank has imperfect
information about the economy. The estimated model conﬁrms the presence of adverse
supply shocks and natural rate misperceptions during the 1970s, which caused policy to
2become overly expansionary. However, we ﬁnd that these errors alone cannot account for
the Great Inﬂation experience.
Using counterfactual simulations, we show that in the absence of informational im-
perfections, following the optimal control policy during the 1960s and 1970s would have
maintained reasonably well-anchored inﬂation expectations and succeeded in achieving a
favorable degree of economic and price stability. Under these assumptions, monetary policy
could have done a very good job oﬀsetting the shocks that buﬀeted the economy during
this period.
However, our model simulations also show that informational imperfections, such as
policymakers’ misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment, signiﬁcantly reduce the
eﬀectiveness of this approach to policy. The presence of imperfect knowledge ampliﬁes the
eﬀects of the underlying shocks, and optimal control monetary policies designed assuming
complete information would have failed to keep inﬂation expectations well anchored. Indeed,
optimal control policies would have avoided the Great Inﬂation only if the weight given to
stabilizing the real economy were relatively modest—with the best results achieved if most
weight were placed on stabilizing prices.
We also examine an alternative policy strategy that could have been more robust and
avoided this experience, even in the presence of supply shocks and natural rate mispercep-
tions. We show that such a strategy would have been very successful at stabilizing inﬂation
and economic activity, despite the large shocks of the 1970s. A striking result is that this
policy rule yields simulated outcomes close to the realized behavior of the economy dur-
ing the Great Moderation starting in the mid-1980s, suggesting that the actual practice of
monetary policy during this period changed in ways that incorporated the key properties
of the robust monetary policy rule.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the narrative
evidence of policymakers’ views on the natural rate of unemployment and the importance
of stabilizing economic activity. The model of the U.S. economy and its estimation are
described in Section 3. Section 4 describes the optimal control monetary policy and its
3implementation in the model simulations. The models of expectations formation and the
simulation methods are described in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 examines the
performance of the optimal control policy using counterfactual model simulations. Section 8
analyzes the performance of a simple robust monetary policy rule, and Section 9 concludes.
2 A Narrative History
In this section, we examine the narrative evidence regarding the views of policymakers
regarding the natural rate of unemployment and the role of stabilizing real activity at “full
employment” before, during, and after the Great Inﬂation.2 We use this narrative evidence
to inform the speciﬁcation of monetary policy in the model simulations reported in the
subsequent sections of the paper.
To set the stage for later events, it is useful to recall the evolution of the policy debate in
the post-World War II period. In the Employment Act of 1946, Congress declared that “it
is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means ... to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power” (quoted in
Council of Economic Advisers, 1966, p. 170).3 Until the 1960s, policymakers interpreted the
Employment Act of 1946 to be a broad mandate to protect price stability, that is, to promote
“purchasing power” and growth and to dampen business cycle ﬂuctuations. In congressional
testimony in August 1957, for example, Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney
Martin stated that “[t]he objective of the System is always the same—to promote monetary
and credit conditions that will foster sustained economic growth together with stability in
the value of the dollar.” To this end, he stressed the importance of price stability: “Price
stability is essential to sustainable growth. Inﬂation fosters maladjustments” (Martin, 1957,
p. 8).
During the 1960s, an increasing number of economists argued that ﬁscal and monetary
2See, Mayer (1999), Meltzer (2003) and Hetzel (2008a), among others, for detailed histories of Federal
Reserve policy during this period.
3Chapter 7 of the 1966 Economic Report of the President (ERP) was devoted to the 20 years of experience
with the Act since it became law on February 20, 1946. This edition of the ERP, published in early 1966,
provides a useful snapshot of policy thinking at the start of the Great Inﬂation.
4policy should play a more active role in managing aggregate demand with the goal of achiev-
ing and maintaining full employment. In 1961, the incoming Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) adopted what became known as the “New Economics,” which was highlighted in the
1962 Economic Report of the President (Council of Economic Advisers, 1962). The new
strategy was eloquently summarized by Walter Heller, who, according to Time Magazine,
as “Chief Economic Adviser of the Kennedy Council, presided over the birth of the New
Economics as a practical policy” (Time Magazine, 1965, p. 67A). Heller said:
The promise of modern economic policy, managed with an eye to maintain-
ing prosperity, subduing inﬂation, and raising the quality of life, is indeed great.
And although we have made no startling conceptual breakthroughs in economics
in recent years, we have, more eﬀectively than ever before, harnessed the ex-
isting economics—the economics that has been taught in the nation’s college
classrooms for some twenty years—to the purposes of prosperity, stability, and
growth. (Heller, 1966, p. 116, emphasis in the original)
A key aspect of the New Economics was a heightened focus on achieving a desired
level of economic activity, as measured by the unemployment rate or the level of GDP,
rather than the less demanding goal of economic expansion. This focus on achieving the
economy’s potential level of activity necessitated the measurement of potential output and
the unemployment rate corresponding to full employment. Arthur Okun, Chairman of the
CEA in the late 1960s, later summarized the implications of the new strategy for economic
policy as follows:
The revised strategy emphasized, as the standard for judging economic perfor-
mance, whether the economy was living up to its potential rather than merely
whether it was advancing. Ideally, total demand should be in balance with the
nation’s supply capabilities. When the balance is achieved, there is neither the
waste of idle resources nor the strain of inﬂationary pressure. The nation is then
actually producing its potential output. (Okun, 1970, p. 40)
5Okun explained that the New Economics reﬂected a “shift in emphasis from the achievement
of expansion to the realization of potential” (p. 41) and explained how this implied greater
policy activism:
[T]he focus on the gap between potential and actual output provided a new
scale for the evaluation of economic performance, replacing the dichotomized
business cycle standard which viewed expansion as satisfactory and recession
as unsatisfactory. This new scale of evaluation, in turn, led to greater activism
in economic policy: As long as the economy was not realizing its potential,
improvement was needed and government had a responsibility to promote it.
(p. 41)
The shift in emphasis towards more explicit targets for employment and the level of eco-
nomic activity was not intended to downplay the need to preserve price stability. The twin
policy objectives of full employment and price stability were stressed repeatedly, starting
with the very ﬁrst study that provided the quantitative deﬁnitions of full employment that
would shape policy throughout the 1960s: “The full employment goal must be understood
as striving for maximum production without inﬂation pressure” (Okun, 1962, p. 82).
The New Economics also emphasized the importance of monetary policy in achieving
these goals. Indeed, the essence of monetary policy was seen in a rather conventional
manner not inconsistent with current views. According to the 1962 Economic Report of the
President: “The proper degree of ‘tightness’ or ‘easiness’ of monetary policy ... depend[s]
on the state of the domestic economy, on the ﬁscal policies of the Government, and on
the international economic position. When the economy is in recession or beset by high
unemployment and excess capacity, monetary policy should clearly be expansionary. ...
When demand is threatening to outrun the economy’s production potential, monetary policy
should be restrictive” (Council of Economic Advisers, 1962, p. 85). As this quote makes
clear, such a policy depends crucially on measuring the economy’s capacity.
The critical test for the New Economics would begin in 1965, when the economy was
nearing what was perceived at the time to be full employment. The apparent success of
6economic policy up to that point was the topic of the cover story of the December 1965
Time magazine. The story noted that “[e]conomists have descended in force from their
ivory towers and now sit conﬁdently at the elbow of almost every important leader in
Government and business, where they are increasingly called upon to forecast, plan and
decide” (p. 65). Indeed, Okun later remarked, “The high-water mark of the economists
prestige in Washington was probably reached late in 1965” (1970, p. 59).
Although the New Economics held sway at the CEA and at many academic institutions,
Federal Reserve Chairman Martin remained skeptical that policymakers would ever possess
the precise knowledge of the economy demanded by the policies of the New Economics.
Although Martin’s attitude was interpreted by some as a mistrust of economists, it would
be more accurate to describe his views as reﬂecting a mistrust of the ﬁne-tuning approach
advocated by some economists who were gaining inﬂuence at the time. As Sherman Maisel,
an economist who joined the Board of Governors in 1965, later recounted: “The press
frequently reported Martin’s dismay over the number of economists appointed to the Board.
He felt that the economy was too complex to explain in detail; intuition would be lost and
false leads followed if too much stress were put on measurement” (Maisel 1973, p. 114).
Nonetheless, by 1965, the center of gravity at the Federal Reserve was shifting away from
what we would describe as Martin’s robust policy approach toward a ﬁne-tuning approach
that sought to achieve a quantitative full-employment goal as well as price stability.
By July 1965 the unemployment rate had fallen to about 4-1/2 percent and the balance
of payments was deteriorating. Martin believed that policy needed to be tightened in
order to restrain inﬂationary pressures. During the second half of 1965, he attempted to
forge a consensus at the Federal Reserve towards policy tightening. But the Council of
Economic Advisers and like-minded economists at the Federal Reserve argued against such
a preemptive move. In their view, a 4 percent unemployment rate corresponded to full
employment. Therefore, the economy was operating below its full-employment level and
inﬂationary pressures were unlikely to emerge.4
4The CEA (1962) put the unemployment rate corresponding to full employment at 4 percent. The 1962
Economic Report of the President indicated that “in the existing economic circumstances, an unemployment
7Martin postponed proposing a policy tightening until December 1965, when, despite
signiﬁcant opposition from members of the Board of Governors, he felt it was no longer
prudent to wait. On December 3, 1965, the Federal Reserve Board increased the discount
rate from 4.0 to 4.5 percent with four members of the Board voting in favor and three
voting against the rate hike. The statement explained that: “With slack in manpower and
productive capacity now reduced to narrow proportions, with the economy closer to full
potential than at any time in nearly a decade ... it was felt that excessive additions to
money and credit availability in an eﬀort to hold present levels of interest rates would spill
over into further price increases. Such price rises would endanger the sustainable nature
of the present business expansion” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1965, p. 1668). Governors Robertson, Mitchell, and Maisel dissented from the discount
rate action “on the ground that it was at least premature in the absence of more compelling
evidence of inﬂationary dangers” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1965,
p. 1668).
In remarks that were delivered a few days later, on December 8, Chairman Martin had
an opportunity to explain his reasoning for the rate hike:
The Federal Reserve, in all its actions, aims always at the same goal: to help the
economy move forward at the fastest sustainable pace. We reach our destination
most rapidly as well as more assuredly when we travel at maximum safe speed—
and this speed cannot be the same under all conditions and at all times. ...
To me, the eﬀective time to act against inﬂationary pressures is when they are
in the development stage—before they have become full-blown and the damage
has been done. Precautionary measures are more likely to be eﬀective than
remedial action: the old proverb that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure applies to monetary policy as well as to anything else. ...
rate of about 4 percent is a reasonable and prudent full employment target for stabilization policy” (p. 46).
Although this goal of a 4 percent unemployment rate may appear overly ambitious in retrospect, it did not
appear so at the time. Indeed, many considered the 4 percent goal for the unemployment rate insuﬃciently
ambitious. For them, 4 percent was seen to be an interim goal, with the ultimate objective being even lower
unemployment.
8[S]o long as inﬂation is merely a threat rather than a reality, it is enough to
prevent the pace of economic expansion from accelerating dangerously. But
once that pace has become unsustainably fast, then it becomes necessary to
reduce the speed, and once such a reduction is started, there is no assurance it
can be stopped in time to avoid an actual downswing (Martin, 1965, emphasis
in original).
The discount rate increase prompted a bruising congressional hearing the following week,
on December 13-14, 1965. The hearing on “Recent Federal Reserve Action and Economic
Policy Coordination” (U.S. Congress, 1966) served as a forum for criticizing Chairman
Martin for tightening policy. It provides an invaluable glimpse into the policy debate at the
time and highlights the crucial role that perceptions about full employment had acquired.
Martin represented the majority view and Governors Mitchell and Maisel, who opposed the
tightening, represented the dissenting view at the hearing on December 13, 1965. At the
hearing, it was conﬁrmed that a crucial reason for the disagreement on the tightening was
a disagreement about the risks to the inﬂation outlook. Furthermore, details emerged as
to the assessments of the Chairman and dissenting members of the Board regarding what
constituted full employment.
The discussion centered on whether a 4 percent unemployment rate was the appropriate
deﬁnition of full employment. Martin remarked, “As long as unemployment of manpower
and plant capacity was greater than could be considered acceptable or normal, we had
every reason to lean on the side of monetary stimulus.” Senator Jacob Javits asked, “Do
you consider a 4 percent unemployment acceptable and normal and is that the basis for
your decision?” (U.S. Congress, 1966, p. 116). Noting that this is a long-standing debate
among experts, Martin replied that, although the Federal Reserve Board would want “as
low a level as it is possible to have,” he did not know what the right level ought to be.
Responding to subsequent questions he added, “We [the Board of Governors] have never
addressed ourselves to a deﬁnitive discussion of the 3 or 4 or 5 percent.” But he admitted
that in making the policy decision the Board deemed that “we were approaching a state
9of full employment” (pp. 116-117). The unemployment rate had fallen to 4.2 percent in
November 1965.
Those arguing against a policy tightening pointed to the fact that unemployment was
still above 4 percent and therefore inﬂationary pressures should be absent, despite the fact
that inﬂation, as measured by the consumer price index, had been edging up for some time.
In his prepared statement at the hearing, Governor Mitchell explained that the challenge
to policy at the end of 1965 was to “ease the economy onto a steady growth path at full
employment,” adding, “I believe this can be done with reasonably stable prices” (United
States Congress, 1966, p. 21). But, with the unemployment rate exceeding 4 percent, he
disagreed that a policy tightening was necessary. “[T]he evidence on prices does not, in my
view, now call for more monetary restraint than is already being applied” (p. 22). The
crux of his argument evolved around the deﬁnition of full employment: “Those who regard
4 percent unemployment ... as the approximate total of the frictionally unemployed ... may
feel that we have achieved our employment goals and that any further progress in reducing
unemployment cannot come from aggregate demand. ... I am not yet ready to agree that
there is no further room for compression of the unemployment rate” (pp. 22-23).
Indeed, Governor Maisel argued that 4 percent may have been too high a target for the
unemployment rate. He explained that he disagreed with the policy decision because he
felt that policy tightening was premature. In his prepared remarks, he noted, “Raising the
discount rate would be interpreted as a view by the Board that because full employment
increases inﬂationary problems, restrictive monetary policy must be invoked at its mere
approach” (p. 31). Asked about his views on full employment, in the light of the various
eﬀorts to reduce frictional unemployment he replied, “My assumption is that the retraining
enables us to say that 4 percent unemployment was only an interim goal. ... As a result
4 percent might have been a proper goal ﬁve years ago. ... Now we need to think of these
retraining programs you have cited and see what our present goal should be. Should it be
3 percent or what?” (p. 181). The view that the interim goal for unemployment could
perhaps be adjusted downwards was also shared by the Council of Economic Advisers. As
10noted in the Economic Report of the President published in early 1966, “The unemployment
rate has now virtually reached the interim target and is projected to fall below 4 percent
in 1966. There is strong evidence that the conditions originally set for lowering the target
are in fact being met, and that the economy can operate eﬃciently at lower unemployment
rates” (Council of Economic Advisers, 1962, p. 75).
This debate centered on estimates of the unemployment rate consistent with price sta-
bility and the proper policy response to movements in inﬂation and unemployment. Im-
portantly, the participants did not possess fundamentally divergent views of the inﬂation
process. Indeed, both sides use a relatively conventional understanding of the process of
inﬂation and the eﬀect of “gaps” on inﬂation. In particular, policymakers clearly believed
that they had the power to control inﬂation through monetary policy. The 1966 Economic
Report of the President provides a view of inﬂation that relates well with models used today:
As a ﬁrst approximation, the classical law of supply and demand leads one
to expect that the change in the price level will depend mainly on the size of
the gap between capacity and actual output. The more production falls short
of potential—i.e., the greater is excess productive capacity—the further prices
should drop. Conversely, when demand outruns aggregate supply, the imbalance
should raise prices. ...
Expectations and attitudes also aﬀect price changes. An economy accustomed
to price stability is less vulnerable to inﬂation” (Council of Economic Advisers,
1966, pp. 63-65).
Note the explicit recognition of the role of expectations in the determination of inﬂation.5
Even when inﬂation got noticeably worse in the second half of the 1960s, the mistaken
5To be sure, there are diﬀerences between the reasoning in the 1960s and modern models. One important
diﬀerence is that the models of the New Economics era typically implied a long-term trade-oﬀ between inﬂa-
tion and unemployment, whereas modern models such as ours typically respect the natural rate hypothesis.
But this diﬀerence is not key for explaining the Great Inﬂation in our view. As explained by Modigliani
and Papademos (1975), in both types of models, there exists a rate of unemployment (the NAIRU) that is
consistent with the policymaker’s deﬁnition of reasonable price stability. In our model, this corresponds to
the natural rate of unemployment. What is critical is that in both types of models, misperceptions about
the NAIRU (or natural rate) have inﬂationary consequences under the optimal control approach to policy.
11belief that the full-employment unemployment rate was very low continued to distort policy
decisions, exacerbating inﬂationary pressures. Although the rise in inﬂation during 1966
and thereafter vindicated Martin’s position, this evidence proved insuﬃcient to stem the
tide toward greater ﬁne-tuning with an emphasis on achieving what was believed to be full
employment. Later, Herbert Stein went so far as to call the belief that the natural rate of
unemployment was 4 percent “the most serious error of the Nixon CEA” (Stein, 1996, p.
19). As he explained, “fascinated by the idea of ‘the natural rate of unemployment,’ which
we thought to be 4 percent, we thought it necessary only to let the unemployment rate
rise slightly above that to hold down inﬂation” (pp. 19-20). The resulting policy actions
would have been the “optimum feasible path,” except they built upon a fatally ﬂawed view
of the productive capacity of the economy. Instead of restoring stability, they led to further
increases in inﬂation.
The inﬂation rate rose from below 2 percent in the early 1960s to over 5 percent by
1970. Figure 1 shows the four-quarter average of the U.S. inﬂation rate, measured by
the GDP price deﬂator, from 1955 to 2003. (Note that throughout this paper, unless
otherwise indicated, the ﬁgures show the four-quarter moving average of the inﬂation rate
to reduce the visual clutter caused by quarterly volatility in this series.) For comparison, the
horizontal line shows the 2 percent inﬂation target that we assume reﬂects the policymaker’s
price stability objective for our counterfactual simulations reported in later sections. The
inﬂation rate was around this level before the Great Inﬂation and returned once again to
this level in the last decade of our sample. Inﬂation expectations became unmoored during
the Great Inﬂation (see Levin and Taylor, 2009, for further discussion of the evidence on
inﬂation expectations) and only in the 1990s did they become anchored again. By the
beginning of the 1980s, survey measures of long-run inﬂation expectations had risen to over
8 percent.
Under Arthur Burns, who became Fed Chairman in 1970, the Federal Reserve continued
the activist bent with even greater force (Hetzel, 1998, Orphanides, 2003). The high degree
of conﬁdence that economists had regarding their ability to measure the capacity of the
12economy and to gauge inﬂationary pressures is nicely illustrated by the staﬀ brieﬁng to the
Board of Governors from August 1970 presented by John Charles Partee (who become a
Governor in 1976), “there is substantial underutilization of resources, as evidenced by a 5 per
cent unemployment rate and an operating rate in manufacturing estimated at well under
80 per cent of capacity. In these circumstances, there is virtually no risk that economic
recovery over the year ahead would add to the inﬂationary problem through stimulation of
excess—or even robust—demand in product or labor markets.” (Board of Governors, 1970,
p. 19).
In his Anguish lecture, Burns admitted that the Federal Reserve was slow to recognize
the upward drift in the natural rate of unemployment, thus adding to inﬂation (Burns, 1979).
Figure 2 plots real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment and a retrospective
measure of the natural rate equal to the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) estimates
available at the time that this paper was written. The actual unemployment rate is plotted
as well. The real-time series for the natural rate is taken from Orphanides and Williams
(2005a), extended to include more recent data. These real-time estimates were constructed
drawing on a number of sources (see Orphanides and Williams, 2002, for details). As seen in
the ﬁgure, diﬀerences between real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment and
current retrospective estimates were especially large and persistent during the second half
of the 1960s and the 1970s. The mean absolute diﬀerence between the real-time and current
estimates was 1.2 percentage points over this period. But such natural rate “misperceptions”
are not merely a historical curiosity, with the mean absolute diﬀerence between the two
measures equalling 0.6 percentage points over the period of 1980-2003.6
The error of overly optimistic estimates of the economy’s capacity was compounded by
the high value placed on achieving full employment relative to price stability. Despite the
upward trend in inﬂation since 1965, the Federal Reserve remained focused on stabilizing
real activity, with the hope that inﬂationary pressures would subside. At the May 1975
6Note that this measure of natural rate misperceptions does not take into account uncertainty regarding
the CBO’s estimates of the natural rate. Instead, it merely measures changes in the estimates that reﬂect
changes in methodology and the eﬀects of new data.
13meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, the Board staﬀ argued that “there is such
a large amount of slack in the economy now that real growth would have to exceed our
projection by a wide margin, and for an extended period, before excess aggregate demand
once again emerged as a signiﬁcant problem.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
1975, p. 26). Furthermore, “Simulations using the econometric model suggested that a
considerably faster rate of expansion could be stimulated without having a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the rate of increase in prices–that a considerably more rapid rate of increase in real GNP
would still be consistent with a further winding down of inﬂationary pressures” (p. 27).
The inﬂation rate in fact did come down from its 1975 peak of about 10 percent over the
next few years, but bottomed out above 5 percent, well in excess of conventional views of
price stability.
Monetary policy moved away from the policy activism of the earlier period and towards
an approach focused more on inﬂation stabilization only after Paul Volcker became Chair-
man in 1979. Volcker eschewed the ﬁne-tuning approach and concentrated instead on the
goal of price stability, seeing this as the only way to eﬀectively reanchor inﬂation expec-
tations and restore broader stability to the economy (Goodfriend and King, 2005, Hetzel,
2008b, Lindsey et al., 2005, Orphanides and Williams, 2005a). He explained his rationale
in his ﬁrst Humphrey-Hawkins testimony on February 19, 1980.
In the past, at critical junctures for economic stabilization policy, we have usu-
ally been more preoccupied with the possibility of near-term weakness in eco-
nomic activity or other objectives than with the implications of our actions for
future inﬂation. To some degree, that has been true even during the long pe-
riod of expansion since 1975. As a consequence, ﬁscal and monetary policies
alike too often have been prematurely or excessively stimulative or insuﬃciently
restrictive. The result has been our now chronic inﬂationary problem, with a
growing conviction on the part of many that this process is likely to continue.
Anticipations of higher prices themselves help speed the inﬂationary process. ...
The broad objective of policy must be to break that ominous pattern. That
14is why dealing with inﬂation has properly been elevated to a position of high
national priority. Success will require that policy be consistently and persistently
oriented to that end. Vacillation and procrastination, out of fears of recession
or otherwise, would run grave risks. Amid the present uncertainties, stimulative
policies could well be misdirected in the short run. More importantly, far from
assuring more growth over time, by aggravating the inﬂationary process and
psychology, they would threaten more instability and unemployment.
(Volcker, 1980, pp. 2-3.)
3 An Estimated Model of the U.S. Economy
We now turn to the evaluation of alternative monetary policy strategies. We use coun-
terfactual simulations of the estimated quarterly model of the U.S. economy described in
Orphanides and Williams (2008). The speciﬁcation of the model is motivated by the recent
literature on micro-founded models incorporating some inertia in inﬂation and output (see
Woodford, 2003, for a fuller discussion). The main diﬀerence from other monetary policy
models is that the unemployment gap is substituted for the output gap in the model to
facilitate estimation using real-time data. The two concepts are closely related in practice
by Okun’s law, and the key properties of the model are largely unaﬀected by this choice.
3.1 The Model
The structural model consists of two equations that describe the behavior of the unemploy-
ment rate and the inﬂation rate and equations describing the time series properties of the
exogenous shocks. To close the model, the short-term interest rate is set by the central
bank, as described in the next section.
The “IS curve” equation is motivated by the Euler equation for consumption with ad-
justment costs or habit:
ut = φuue
t+1 + (1 − φu)ut−1 + αu (ie
t − πe
t+1 − r∗) + vt, (1)
vt = ρvvt−1 + ev,t, ev ∼ N(0,σ2
ev). (2)
15Equation (1) relates the unemployment rate, ut, to the unemployment rate expected in the
next period, one lag of the unemployment rate, and the diﬀerence between the expected ex
ante real interest rate, re
t—equal to the diﬀerence between the nominal short-term interest
rate, it, and the expected inﬂation rate in the following period, πt+1—and the natural rate
of interest, r∗. The unemployment rate is subject to a shock, vt, that is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process with innovation variance σ2
ev. The AR(1) speciﬁcation for the shocks is
based on the evidence of serial correlation in the residuals of the estimated unemployment
equation, as discussed later.
The “Phillips curve” equation is motivated by the New Keynesian Phillips curve with
indexation:
πt = φππe
t+1 + (1 − φπ)πt−1 + απ(ut − u∗
t) + eπ,t, eπ ∼ N(0,σ2
eπ). (3)
It relates inﬂation, πt, (measured as the annualized percent change in the gross national
product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP) price index, depending on the period)
during quarter t to lagged inﬂation, expected future inﬂation (denoted by πe
t+1), and the
diﬀerence between the unemployment rate, ut, and the natural rate of unemployment, u∗
t,
during the current quarter. The parameter φπ measures the importance of expected inﬂation
on the determination of inﬂation, while (1−φπ) captures the eﬀects of inﬂation indexation.
The “markup” shock, eπ,t, is assumed to be a white noise disturbance with variance σ2
eπ.
We model the low frequency behavior of the natural rate of unemployment as an exoge-
nous AR(1) process independent of all other variables:
u∗
t = (1 − ρu∗)¯ u∗ + ρu∗u∗
t−1 + eu∗,t, eu∗ ∼ N(0,σ2
e∗
u). (4)
We assume this process is stationary based on the ﬁnding using the standard augmented
Dickey-Fuller test that one can reject the null of nonstationarity of the unemployment rate
over 1950–2003 at the 5 percent level.
163.2 Model Estimation and Calibration
The IS curve and Phillips curve equations are estimated using forecasts from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) as proxies for the expectations that appear in the equations.7
Expectations are assumed to be formed in the previous quarter; that is, the expectations
aﬀecting inﬂation and unemployment in period t are those collected in quarter t − 1. This
matches the informational structure in many theoretical models (see Woodford, 2003, and
Giannoni and Woodford, 2005). To match the inﬂation and unemployment data as closely
as possible with these forecasts, the ﬁrst announced estimates of these series are used. These
are obtained from the Real-Time Dataset for Macroeconomists maintained by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. In estimating the inﬂation equation, the Congressional Bud-
get Oﬃce (2001) estimates of the natural rate of unemployment are used as proxies for the
true values over time. The data sample used for estimating the model runs from 1968:Q4
to 2004:Q2, where the starting date is the ﬁrst sample point in the SPF.8
Estimation results are reported in equations (5) through (7), with standard errors in-
dicated in parentheses. The IS curve equation is estimated using least squares with AR(1)
residuals. Unrestricted estimation of the IS curve equation yields a point estimate for φu of
0.39, with a standard error of 0.15. This estimate is below the lower bound of 0.5 implied
by theory; however, the null hypothesis of a value of 0.5 is not rejected by the data.9 Thus
the restriction φu = 0.5 is imposed in estimating the remaining parameters of the equation.
Note that the estimated equation also includes a constant term (not shown) that provides
an estimate of the natural real interest rate, which is assumed to be constant:
ut = 0.5ue
t+1 + 0.5ut−1 +0.056
(0.022)
(re
t − r∗) + vt, (5)
7Speciﬁcally, the mean forecasts of the unemployment rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate are
used. The inﬂation forecasts are constructed using the annualized log diﬀerence of the GNP or GDP price
deﬂator, taken from the reported forecasts of real and nominal GNP or GDP. The survey is currently
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. See Croushore (1993) and Croushore and Stark
(2001) for details on the survey methodology.
8Expectations for the Treasury bill rate were not collected in the ﬁrst few years of the sample. When
these are not available, the expectations of the three-month rate implied by the slope of the term structure
under the expectations hypothesis are used.
9This ﬁnding is consistent with the results reported in Giannoni and Woodford (2005) who, in a similar
model, ﬁnd that the corresponding coeﬃcient is constrained to be at its theoretical lower bound.
17vt = 0.513
(0.085)
vt−1 + ev,t, ˆ σev = 0.30, (6)
πt = 0.5πe




t) + eπ,t, ˆ σeπ = 1.35. (7)
Unrestricted estimation of the Phillips curve equation yields a point estimate for φπ
of 0.51, just barely above the lower bound implied by theory.10 For symmetry with the
treatment of the IS curve, the restriction φπ = 0.5 is imposed and the remaining parameters
are estimated using ordinary least squares. The estimated residuals for this equation show
no signs of serial correlation in the price equation, consistent with the assumption of the
model.
We do not estimate the model of the natural rate of unemployment; instead, we set
the autocorrelation parameter, ρr∗, to 0.99 and set the unconditional mean to the sample
average of the unemployment rate.
4 Monetary Policy
We focus on two alternative approaches to monetary policy. The ﬁrst is the optimal control
approach. The second is a simple monetary policy that is closely related to nominal income
growth targeting. In both cases, the policy instrument is the nominal short-term interest
rate. We assume that the central bank observes all variables from previous periods when
making the current-period policy decision. We further assume that policy is conducted
under commitment.
4.1 Optimal Control Monetary Policy
It is important to make clear from the start that we make no claim that Federal Reserve
set policy according to the mechanical optimal control algorithms we describe in this paper
during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, the development of formal quantitative monetary policy
evaluation exercises was still in its infancy at that time. The Federal Reserve Board staﬀ
10For comparison, Giannoni and Woodford (2005) ﬁnd that the corresponding coeﬃcient is constrained
to be at its theoretical lower bound of 0.5.
18ﬁrst completed an ambitious project using optimal control in the mid-1970s (Kalchbrenner
and Tinsley, 1976). Although Federal Reserve Governor Henry Wallich (1976) stated that
“[t]he use of optimal control techniques in planning for economic stabilization is approaching
the policy stage,” in fact, this project was never integrated with the policy process at the
Federal Reserve during this period.11 We would argue that the optimal control approach
resembles the spirit of ﬁne-tuning practiced by policymakers at that time. In any case, our
goal is to evaluate the performance of such an optimal control strategy under the conditions
that existed in the 1960s and 1970s.
The optimal control approach stipulates that the policy instrument is chosen to minimize
the central bank’s loss function given the constraints imposed by the central bank’s model.
We construct the optimal control policy rule, as is typical in the literature, assuming that
the policymaker knows the true parameters of the structural model and assumes all agents
use rational expectations. The parameters of the optimal control policy are computed
assuming the central bank knows the natural rate of unemployment.12 Note that for the
optimal control policy, as well as the simple monetary policy rules described below, we use
lagged information in the determination of the interest rate, reﬂecting the lagged release of
data.
We assume that the central bank’s objective is to minimize a loss equal to the weighted
sum of the unconditional variances of the inﬂation rate, the diﬀerence between the unem-
ployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment, and the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the nominal
federal funds rate:
L = V ar(π − 2) + λV ar(u − u∗) + νV ar(∆(i)), (8)
where V ar(x) denotes the unconditional variance of variable x. We assume an inﬂation
target of 2 percent. In the following, we consider diﬀerent values of the parameters of the
11Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the loss function in Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1976) penalized
an unemployment rate above 4.8 percent and an inﬂation rate above 2.5 percent. This target for the
unemployment rate is consistent with our analysis of real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment
used in the model simulations in this paper. The 2.5 percent inﬂation target is somewhat higher than the 2
percent inﬂation target we assume in our model simulations.
12See, for example, Sargent’s (2007) description of the optimal policy approach.
19loss function.13
The optimal control policy is described by a set of equations that describes the ﬁrst-
order optimality condition for monetary policy and the behavior of the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints on the optimization problem implied by the structural equa-
tions of the model economy. Because we are interested in describing the setting of interest
rates in a potentially misspeciﬁed model, it is useful to represent the optimal control policy
by an equation that relates the policy instrument to macroeconomic variables, rather than
in terms of Lagrange multipliers that are model speciﬁc. There are inﬁnitely many such
representations. In the following, we focus on one representation of the optimal control
policy, denoted as the “OC” policy. In the OC policy, the current interest rate depends
on three lags of the inﬂation rate, the diﬀerence between the unemployment rate and the
central bank’s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment, and the diﬀerence between the
nominal interest rate and the natural rate of interest. The OC representation yields a de-
terminate rational expectations equilibrium in our model. We ﬁnd that including three lags
of these variables is suﬃcient to very closely mimic the optimal control outcome assuming
the central bank observes the natural rate of unemployment.14
As discussed previously, during much of the 1960s and 1970s, policymakers placed a
great deal of weight on the stabilization of real activity. We represent such preferences with
values of λ = 16 and ν = 1. In that case, the OC policy is given by the following equation:
it = 1.16it−1 − 0.05it−2 − 0.21it−3 (9)
+0.23πt−1 − 0.07πt−2 + 0.05πt−3
−3.70(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t−1) + 2.81(ut−2 − ˆ u∗
t−1) − 0.15(ut−3 − ˆ u∗
t−1),
plus a constant reﬂecting the constant natural rate of interest and inﬂation target, where
ˆ u∗
t denotes the central bank’s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment.
13Based on an Okun’s law type relationship, the variance of the unemployment gap is about one-fourth
that of the output gap, so a choice of λ = 4 corresponds to equal weights on inﬂation and output gap
variability.
14In deriving the OC policy, we use the innovation processes from the estimated model and set the
innovation standard deviation of the natural rate of unemployment to 0.07. See Orphanides and Williams
(2009) for details.
20In the following, we also examine the performance of the OC policy derived for alterna-
tive values of λ. The resulting OC policy for λ = 4 is given by the following equation:
it = 1.17it−1 + 0.02it−2 − 0.28it−3 (10)
+0.18πt−1 + 0.03πt−2 + 0.01πt−3
−2.47(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t−1) + 2.11(ut−2 − ˆ u∗
t−1) − 0.33(ut−3 − ˆ u∗
t−1).
Compared to the OC policy derived with λ = 16, this policy is characterized by a stronger
response to inﬂation and a much smaller response to the unemployment rate. Finally, the
OC policy derived for λ = 0 and ν = 1 is given by:
it = 1.12it−1 + 0.13it−2 − 0.34it−3 (11)
+0.17πt−1 + 0.09πt−2 − 0.01πt−3
−1.63(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t−1) + 1.53(ut−2 − ˆ u∗
t−1) − 0.38(ut−3 − ˆ u∗
t−1).
As expected, this policy is characterized by a stronger response to inﬂation and a much
smaller response to the unemployment rate than the OC policy derived for λ = 4.
4.2 Central Bank Natural Rate Estimates
As seen in these equations, a key input into the setting of OC policies is the central bank’s
estimate of the natural rate of unemployment. In deriving the OC policy, we assumed that
the central bank knows the true structure of the economy, including the value of the natural
rate of unemployment. In the model simulations, however, we also examine alternative
assumptions regarding the central bank’s knowledge of the natural rate. One alternative
is that the central bank’s estimates of the natural rate follow the historical pattern of the
real-time estimates reported in Figure 2. We refer to this case as “historical natural rate
misperceptions.” A second alternative is that the central bank estimates the natural rate
based on the Kalman ﬁlter applied to the Phillips curve equation for inﬂation. We refer to
this case as “Kalman ﬁlter estimates.” In each case, we assume that the true values of the
natural rate of unemployment follow the current CBO estimates shown in Figure 2.
21In the case of Kalman ﬁlter estimation of the natural rate of unemployment, we as-
sume that the central bank uses an appropriate Kalman ﬁlter consistent with the data.
In particular, the central bank’s real-time Kalman ﬁlter estimate of the natural rate of
unemployment, ˆ u∗
t, is given by
ˆ u∗
t = a1ˆ u∗
t−1 + a2(u∗
t − eπ,t/απ), (12)
where a1 and a2 are the Kalman gain parameters. The term within the parentheses is the
current-period “shock” to inﬂation that incorporates the eﬀects of the transitory inﬂation
disturbance and the deviation of the natural rate of unemployment from its unconditional
mean, scaled in units of the unemployment rate. Note that the central bank only observes
this “surprise” and not the decomposition into its two components.
The optimal values of the gain parameters depend on the variances of the various shocks
in the model. Based on a calibrated Kalman ﬁlter model, we assume that the central bank
uses the following values: a1 = 0.982 and a2 = 0.008 (see Orphanides and Williams, 2009,
for the derivation of these values). We assume that the central bank starts the simulation
with the value of 4 percent, consistent with the evidence from real-time estimates reported
earlier.
5 Expectations and Simulation Methods
We assume that private agents and, in some cases, the central bank form expectations
using an estimated reduced-form forecasting model. Speciﬁcally, following Orphanides and
Williams (2005b), we posit that private agents engage in perpetual learning, that is, they
reestimate their forecasting model using a constant-gain least squares algorithm that weights
recent data more heavily than past data. (See Sargent, 1999; Cogley and Sargent, 2001; and
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 for related treatments of learning.) This approach to modeling
learning allows for the possible presence of time variation in the economy, including the
natural rates of interest and unemployment. It also implies that agents’ estimates are
always subject to sampling variation, that is, the estimates do not eventually converge to
ﬁxed values.
22Private agents forecast inﬂation, the unemployment rate, and the short-term interest
rate using an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model containing three lags of these
three variables and a constant. Note that we assume that private agents do not observe or
estimate the natural rate of unemployment directly in forming expectations. The eﬀects of
time variation in the natural rate on forecasts are reﬂected in the forecasting VAR by the
lags of the interest rate, inﬂation rate, and unemployment rate. As discussed in Orphanides
and Williams (2008), this VAR forecasting model provides accurate forecasts in model
simulations.
At the end of each period, agents update their estimates of their forecasting model
using data through the current period. Let Yt denote the 1 × 3 vector consisting of the
inﬂation rate, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate, each measured at time t:
Yt = (πt,ut,it). Further, let Xt be the 10 × 1 vector of regressors in the forecast model:
Xt = (1,πt−1,ut−1,it−1,...,πt−3,ut−3,it−3). Also, let ct be the 10×3 vector of coeﬃcients
of the forecasting model. Using data through period t, the coeﬃcients of the forecasting
model can be written in recursive form as follows:
ct = ct−1 + κR−1
t Xt(Yt − X′
tct−1), (13)
Rt = Rt−1 + κ(XtX′
t − Rt−1), (14)
where κ is the gain. Agents construct the multiperiod forecasts that appear in the inﬂation
and unemployment equations in the model using the estimated VAR.
The matrix Rt may not be full rank at times. To circumvent this problem, in each
period of the model simulations, we check the rank of Rt. If it is less than full rank, we
assume that agents apply a standard Ridge regression (Hoerl and Kennard, 1970), where
Rt is replaced by Rt + 0.00001 ∗ I(10) and I(10) is a 10 × 10 identity matrix.
5.1 Calibrating the Learning Rate
A key parameter in the learning model is the private agent updating parameter, κ. Esti-
mates of this parameter tend to be imprecise and sensitive to model speciﬁcation, but tend
23to lie between 0 and 0.04.15 We take 0.02 to be a reasonable benchmark value for κ.
6 Model Simulations
We examine a set of alternative counterfactual simulations to investigate the implications
of alternative monetary policy frameworks on macroeconomic developments over the past
40 years. We start our simulations in the ﬁrst quarter of 1966, which corresponds to what
we and many observers consider to be the beginning of the Great Inﬂation in the United
States.
6.1 Initial Conditions
The state variables of the model economy with learning are as follows: the current and
lagged values of the inﬂation rate, the federal funds rate, the unemployment rate, the true
natural rate of unemployment, the real-time estimate of the natural rate, the shocks to the
structural equations, and the matrices C and R for the forecasting model. We initialize the
C and R matrices using the values implied by the reduced-form solution of the model under
rational expectations for the stipulated monetary policy rule. In so doing, we are implicitly
assuming that the initial conditions for the agents’ learning model are consistent with the
policy rule in place. That is, we assume that at the start of the simulation expectations are
well aligned with the monetary policy regime under consideration. Over time, expectations
then evolve as described above. This assumption implies that the initial conditions for these
state variables are diﬀerent across the counterfactual simulations. As a result, the simulated
paths will often diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the historical patterns.
To compute the history of equation residuals, we ﬁrst compute the implied forecasts
from our forecasting model of inﬂation, the unemployment rate, and the federal funds rate
over the period 1966–2003. We treat the forecasts generated by the learning model as
the true data for agents’ expectations and then compute tracking residuals, that is, the
values of the historical residuals for the equations for the unemployment rate, the inﬂation
rate, and the natural rate of unemployment. Thus, given these residuals and the historical
15See Sheridan (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2005a), Branch and Evans (2006), and Milani (2007).
24path for the nominal interest rate, the model’s predictions will exactly match the historical
paths for all endogenous variables. We then conduct counterfactual experiments in which
we modify assumptions regarding monetary policy, but do not change the paths for the
equation residuals for unemployment, inﬂation, and the natural rate of unemployment,
which we assume are exogenous. Each counterfactual simulation starts in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1966 and ends in the fourth quarter of 2003.
7 Performance of Optimal Control Policies
If the Federal Reserve had accurate estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, then
the OC policy derived assuming a moderately large weight on unemployment stabilization
would have avoided the Great Inﬂation. Figure 3 shows the simulated paths for key vari-
ables assuming that the Fed follows the OC policy derived under λ = 16 and ν = 1. The
left column of the ﬁgure shows the outcomes assuming the Fed knew the true values of
the natural rate of unemployment. Inﬂation would have been somewhat volatile during the
1970s, reﬂecting the eﬀects of the large shocks hitting the economy at the time, but the
deviation of the four-quarter inﬂation rate from target would not have exceeded three per-
centage points during that period. For comparison, the ﬁgure also shows the corresponding
actual and survey data over the same period.
In the absence of natural rate misperceptions, inﬂation expectations would have re-
mained reasonably contained during the 1970s. The middle left panel shows the simulated
four-quarter-ahead inﬂation expectations under the OC policy. For comparison, the ﬁg-
ure also shows the corresponding SPF inﬂation forecasts, which rose dramatically in the
1970s.16 As seen in Figure 3, the OC policy acts to raise the unemployment rate up to the
natural rate by 1967 and holds the unemployment rate moderately above the natural rate
through most of the 1970s, oﬀsetting the inﬂationary eﬀects of the supply shocks of that
period. These policy actions help stabilize inﬂation and inﬂation expectations and avoid
the need of a disinﬂationary policy at the end of the decade.
16For this ﬁgure and those that follow, the SPF three-quarter-ahead inﬂation forecast is substituted for
the four-quarter-ahead forecast in the periods when the latter is missing from the survey.
25This same OC policy performs dismally in the face of the historical natural rate mis-
perceptions, leading to a Great Inﬂation outcome in the 1970s. The panels in the right
column of Figure 3 show the outcomes when the Fed uses the historical real-time natural
rate estimates. The simulated path of inﬂation during the 1970s is similar to that seen
in the actual data. But, unlike the actual data, the high volatility of inﬂation continues
through to the end of the sample. Owing to the low real-time estimate of the natural rate
of unemployment, in this simulation the Fed does not act to raise unemployment during the
latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s, as seen in the right panel of Figure 3. This extended
period of easy policy leads to a sustained rise in inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. By the
time the supply shocks of the 1970s strike, inﬂation expectations are completely untethered
from the assumed 2 percent target.
Could the high inﬂation of the late 1970s have been mitigated by following an optimal
control policy predicated on placing a much lower weight on unemployment stabilization?
Orphanides and Williams (2008, 2009) show that “robust optimal control” policies derived
assuming downward biased values of λ and ν can be robust to imperfect knowledge of
the type studied in the present paper. We examine the eﬀectiveness of such an approach
by evaluating the performance of the OC policies derived assuming alternative weights on
unemployment in the central bank loss of 4 and 0.
The OC policy derived assuming λ = 4 avoids the worst of the Great Inﬂation during
the 1970s, even with natural rate misperceptions. The left column in Figure 4 shows the
simulation results when the natural rate is known by the Fed. The results are similar to the
case of the OC policy derived assuming λ = 16. In the case of natural rate misperceptions,
monetary policy is too easy during the late 1960s and early 1970s and, as a result, inﬂation
and inﬂation expectations trend upwards. But, the rise in inﬂation during this period is
not as extreme as seen in the actual data.
In the absence of natural rate misperceptions, the OC policy that places no weight on
unemployment stabilization performs very well during the 1970s (and indeed for the entire
sample period). The left column panels in Figure 5 show the simulated paths of inﬂation,
26inﬂation expectations, and unemployment under this policy in the case of no natural rate
misperceptions. Under this policy, ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and inﬂation expectations are far
more muted than under the OC policy derived assuming λ = 4 or 16. This greater stabiliza-
tion of inﬂation comes at the cost of only somewhat greater variability in the unemployment
rate.
With the historical natural rate misperceptions, the OC policy derived with a zero
weight placed on the stabilization of unemployment in the loss function avoids the Great
Inﬂation, but still allows some inﬂation volatility to develop. The panels in the right column
of Figure 5 show the simulated paths of inﬂation, inﬂation expectations, and unemployment
under this policy in the case of historical natural rate misperceptions. Given the incorrect
low estimate of the natural rate of unemployment at the start of the simulation, this policy
keeps unemployment too low for too long. This mistake allows inﬂation to rise and inﬂa-
tion expectations to become untethered. Note that the policy error does not stem from a
concern for stabilizing unemployment for its own good, but instead reﬂects the importance
of deviations of unemployment from its natural rate for the future path of inﬂation. With
inﬂation reaching 6 percent by mid-decade, policy acts aggressively to bring inﬂation back
down to target by the end of the 1970s and a major stagﬂation is averted.
Table 1 quantiﬁes the performance of the various OC policies during the late 1960s and
1970s. The ﬁrst three columns report the root mean squared diﬀerences of the inﬂation
rate from its target value of 2 percent, the unemployment rate from it natural rate, and the
ﬁrst diﬀerence of the short-term interest rate, respectively. The ﬁnal three columns report
the implied values of the central bank loss for three diﬀerent values of λ, the weight placed
on the squared deviations of the unemployment rate from the natural rate. Table 2 reports
the same set of statistics for the full sample of 1966-2003.
The ﬁrst row of Table 1 reports key summary statistics for the actual data over the
period of the Great Inﬂation from 1966 to 1979. Corresponding results for the full sample are
reported in Table 2. Rows 2-4 of each table report the simulated outcomes under OC policies
in the case of no natural rate misperceptions. All three of these policies yield ﬂuctuations
27in inﬂation and the unemployment rate over 1966-1979 that are broadly comparable to
those experienced during the period of the Great Moderation and nothing like the horrible
performance that actually occurred during the Great Inﬂation.
The magnitude of simulated inﬂation ﬂuctuations under the OC policies with histori-
cal natural rate misperceptions depends crucially on the weight placed on unemployment
stabilization in the objective function. Rows 5-7 of Tables 1 and 2 report the results for
OC policies with historical natural rate misperceptions. The policy designed assuming no
weight on unemployment stabilization performs the best of the three, even if the true value
of λ is 16. The OC policy designed for λ = 16 yields much larger central bank losses over
this period.
Interestingly, given the presence of natural rate misperceptions, the OC policies derived
with a nonnegligible weight on stabilizing unemployment yield much greater inﬂation vari-
ability in the ﬁnal 20 years of our sample than is seen in the data. Although these policies
describe the Great Inﬂation period reasonably well, they do not match the experience since
the disinﬂation of the early 1980s. In contrast, the OC policy derived assuming no weight
on unemployment stabilization does a much better job of describing inﬂation during the
latter part of the sample.
The performance of OC policies is signiﬁcantly improved if the central bank uses an
appropriate Kalman ﬁlter to estimate the natural rate of unemployment, rather than using
the historical estimates. Rows 8-10 of Tables 1 and 2 report the summary statistics in the
case of Kalman ﬁlter estimation of natural rates. The simulated outcomes lie between those
of the two cases previously considered of no misperceptions and historical misperceptions.
As in the case of historical misperceptions, the OC policy designed for no weight on un-
employment stabilization performs the best. We also experimented with alternative values
of the Kalman gain. A higher gain applied to the inﬂation surprise, a2, implies a quicker
adjustment of the central bank’s estimate of the natural rate from 4 percent toward its true
value of roughly 6 percent early in the sample. As a result, the OC policies using higher
gains perform somewhat better than the results reported in Tables 1 and 2. Conversely, a
28lower value of a2 than our benchmark value implies worse performance during this period
than reported.
In summary, this analysis suggests that a benevolent policymaker striving to achieve
full employment and price stability using modern optimal control methods could well have
made policy errors during the 1960s and 1970s that would have led to unmoored inﬂation
expectations and highly volatile inﬂation. The magnitude of these problems depends on the
weight that the policymaker places on the stabilization of real activity. Only if that weight
is relatively small or if the policymaker has excellent information about the economy does
the optimal control policy perform reasonably well.
8 Performance of a Simple Policy Rule
We now examine the performance of an alternative monetary policy rule that has proven
to be robust to various forms of model uncertainty in other contexts (see Tetlow, 2006, and
Orphanides and Williams, 2008, 2009). The rule was proposed by Orphanides and Williams
(2007) and takes the form:
it = it−1 + θπ(¯ πe
t+3 − π∗) + θ∆u(ut−1 − ut−2). (15)
A key feature of this policy is the absence of any measures of natural rates in the determi-
nation of policy. This policy rule is related to the elastic price standard proposed by Hall
(1984), whereby the central bank aims to maintain a stipulated relationship between the
forecast of the unemployment rate and the price level. It is also closely related to the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of a modiﬁed Taylor-type policy rule in which the forecast of the price level is
substituted for the forecast of the inﬂation rate.
We choose the parameters of these simple rules to minimize the central bank loss for
λ = 4 and ν = 1, under the assumptions of rational expectations and constant natural
rates.17 The resulting optimized simple rule is given by:
it = it−1 + 1.74 (¯ πe
t+3 − π∗) − 1.19 (ut−1 − ut−2). (16)
17If we allow for time-varying natural rates that are known by all agents, the optimized parameters of this
simple rule under rational expectations are nearly unchanged. The relative performance of this policy is also
unaﬀected.
29This is the same rule as analyzed in Orphanides and Williams (2008, 2009), where it was
shown to perform well under imperfect knowledge.
According to the model simulation, if the Fed had followed this simple rule over the past
40 years, inﬂation would have been relatively stable and the Great Inﬂation would never
have occurred. Figure 6 compares the simulated paths of inﬂation, inﬂation expectations,
the real interest rate, and the unemployment rate under this simple robust policy rule to
the actual data. Because this simple policy rule does not respond to the natural rate of
unemployment, the simulations are invariant to the assumed path of central bank natural
rate estimates. Inﬂation does ﬂuctuate a bit during the 1970s, reﬂecting the large shocks of
that period, but the deviations from target are short-lived. The simulated path for inﬂation
is very stable since the mid-1980s.
This simple policy rule is extremely eﬀective at keeping inﬂation expectations well an-
chored. Although the inﬂation rate itself ﬂuctuates under the simple policy rule, inﬂation
is expected to return to near its target rate of 2 percent within one year. As discussed
in Orphanides and Williams (2008), the anchoring of inﬂation expectations is key to the
success of this rule in stabilizing inﬂation and unemployment. A striking result is that this
simple rule does better at stabilizing inﬂation and inﬂation expectations than the OC policy
derived for λ = 0. The anchoring of inﬂation expectations implies that the gap between
the unemployment rate and the natural rate is considerably smaller throughout the sample
than in the actual data.
Interestingly, the simulated behavior of inﬂation, inﬂation expectations, and unemploy-
ment over the latter part of our sample is very close to that of the actual data. This
ﬁnding suggests that the actual policy framework during this period may not have been
very diﬀerent from that prescribed by this robust simple rule.
The simple robust policy rule performs as well as or better than the best OC policy where
the central bank uses the Kalman ﬁlter to estimate the natural rate of unemployment. The
ﬁnal rows of Tables 1 and 2 report the summary statistics for the robust policy rule. This
holds for any of the three values of the central bank loss considered here.
30The anchoring of long-run inﬂation expectations under the simple robust policy rule
is illustrated by the small variance in the simulated path for inﬂation expectations over
the next 10 years. The thin solid line in Figure 7 shows the simulated path for 10-year
inﬂation expectations when monetary policy follows the simple robust policy rule. This line
ﬂuctuates very little over the entire sample. By comparison, surveys of 10-year consumer
price index inﬂation expectations (not shown) reached around 8 percent at the start of the
1980s, and then gradually fell to around 2-1/2 percent in the late 1990s. Since that time,
these long-run inﬂation expectations have ﬂuctuated very little.
In contrast, the OC policy derived assuming λ = 16 does a poor job of anchoring
long-run inﬂation expectations. The thick sold line in the chart shows the path of 10-year
inﬂation expectations under the OC policy optimized for λ = 16 and assuming historical
natural rate misperceptions. This line ﬂuctuates considerably over the sample, reﬂecting the
relatively poor anchoring of inﬂation expectations under this regime. The dashed line shows
the corresponding outcomes under the OC policy optimized for λ = 16 and assuming no
natural rate misperceptions. Not surprisingly, long-run inﬂation expectations are generally
reasonably well anchored in this case. However, even in this case, there are extended
episodes during the 1970s and early 2000s when long-run inﬂation expectations ﬂuctuate
signiﬁcantly.
9 Conclusion
Our narrative account of the Great Inﬂation squarely attributes the policy failures on mis-
takes consistent with what was viewed by many to be the latest advances in macroeconomics
as embodied in the New Economics. The ﬁne-tuning approach to monetary policy, with
its emphasis on stabilizing the level of real activity, might have succeeded if policymakers
had possessed accurate real-time assessments of the natural rate of unemployment. In the
event, they did not and they failed to account for their imperfect information regarding
the economy’s potential and the eﬀects of these misperceptions on the evolution of inﬂation
expectations and inﬂation. Price and economic stability were only restored after the Federal
31Reserve, under Chairman Volcker, refocused policy on establishing and maintaining price
stability.
This paper shows that, even if the Federal Reserve had applied modern optimal control
techniques in conducting monetary policy, it would not have done much better at stabilizing
inﬂation during the 1970s owing to the presence of realistic informational imperfections
such as misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment. Such optimal control policies
would likely have failed to keep inﬂation expectations well anchored, resulting in highly
volatile inﬂation. An optimal control policy would have succeeded only if the weight placed
on stabilizing the real economy were relatively modest—with the best results achieved if
virtually all the weight were placed on stabilizing prices. Finally, we show that a strategy of
following a simple ﬁrst-diﬀerence policy rule would have been more successful than optimal
control policies in the presence of realistic informational imperfections. In addition, this
policy rule yields simulated outcomes close to the realized behavior of the economy during
the Great Moderation starting in the mid-1980s, suggesting that the actual practice of
monetary policy during this period changed in ways that incorporated the key properties
of the robust monetary policy rule.
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35Table 1: Loss Comparison (1966-1979)
RMSD Loss L
κ π - 2 u − u∗ ∆i λ = 0 λ = 4 λ = 16
Historical data 4.2 1.5 0.7 18.2 27.8 56.5
No misperceptions
OC (λ = 0) 1.4 1.0 0.8 2.7 6.5 17.9
OC (λ = 4) 1.4 0.8 1.0 3.1 5.6 13.0
OC (λ = 16) 1.5 0.7 1.5 4.5 6.3 11.4
Historical misperceptions
OC (λ = 0) 2.3 1.0 0.6 5.6 9.3 20.3
OC (λ = 4) 3.2 1.0 0.9 10.9 14.9 27.1
OC (λ = 16) 4.7 1.1 1.3 24.0 28.9 43.4
Kalman ﬁlter
OC (λ = 0) 2.0 0.9 0.7 4.4 8.0 18.6
OC (λ = 4) 2.6 0.9 0.9 7.6 11.2 22.9
OC (λ = 16) 3.7 1.0 1.3 15.3 19.3 31.2
Robust policy rule 1.5 0.9 1.4 4.3 7.6 17.4
36Table 2: Loss Comparison (1966-2003)
RMSD Loss L
κ π - 2 u − u∗ ∆i λ = 0 λ = 4 λ = 16
Historical data 3.3 1.4 1.0 11.6 19.6 43.8
No misperceptions
OC (λ = 0) 1.2 0.7 0.6 2.0 4.0 10.0
OC (λ = 4) 1.3 0.6 0.9 2.5 3.8 7.7
OC (λ = 16) 1.5 0.5 1.2 3.7 4.6 7.3
Historical misperceptions
OC (λ = 0) 1.7 0.8 0.6 3.4 5.7 12.9
OC (λ = 4) 2.3 0.8 0.8 6.0 8.4 15.5
OC (λ = 16) 3.3 0.8 1.2 12.4 14.9 22.5
Kalman ﬁlter
OC (λ = 0) 1.6 0.8 0.6 2.9 5.3 12.6
OC (λ = 4) 2.0 0.8 0.8 4.8 7.0 13.9
OC (λ = 16) 2.7 0.8 1.2 8.8 11.1 18.0
Robust policy rule 1.3 0.8 1.0 2.7 5.2 12.6
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39Figure 3: Counterfactual Simulations under OC Policy with λ = 16
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40Figure 4: Counterfactual Simulations under OC Policy with λ = 4
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41Figure 5: Counterfactual Simulations under OC Policy with λ = 0
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